Sergio Flores/AFP via Getty Images In his new book, the Republican strategist Patrick Ruffini makes a confession: He went to college. The co-founder of Echelon Insights, a veteran of the 2004 George W. Bush campaign, was as surprised as anyone when Trump won the presidency. That victory made sense when Ruffini realized that an education gap — college-educated voters versus everybody else — was supplanting the decades-old class gap between Republicans and Democrats. His field work and research on that phenomenon turned into “Party of the People,” a look at how Democratic mistakes and MAGA policies (like abandoning entitlement reform and free trade) could turn the GOP into a multi-racial populist party. This is an edited transcript of our conversation about it. Americana: Republicans had a pretty mediocre 2022. What are the trends that can make them the majority, working-class party? Did they stall out? Patrick Ruffini: The Dobbs decision was the difference between a five- or six-point Republican landslide and their barely eking out a House majority in 2022. But if Trump or another Republican were to simply recreate the GOP’s performance in the House in the midterms, they’d win. Despite clearly falling short in a number of races, the GOP got a record high number of Black and Hispanic voters for a midterms. Part of having a working-class coalition is that Republicans may now have an easier time in presidential rather than downballot elections, in a direct reversal of the Obama era. In 2020, the same trends we saw realign working class white voters came for nonwhite voters, Hispanics especially, but some Black and Asian American voters too, especially in the working class. This tells us that the divide in the country is more cultural, along education lines, than it is racial, and it turns out that the nonwhite working class has a lot more in common with the white working class than people thought. That’s particularly true when you have a candidate like Trump who plays on populist themes, instead of the old country club, Chamber of Commerce-style Republican. Americana: What did Trump do to advance this? There’s a lot in the book about mistakes that Democrats made, but what actual actions was he taking to convert these voters? Patrick Ruffini: The economy was growing in a way that uniquely benefited Latinos. Their incomes went up by about 20% during a period that spans from the end of Obama’s presidency through most of Trump’s presidency. Trump, being on the tail end of this, got the credit. And border regions like the Rio Grande Valley are at the top of the heap in terms of income growth. On top of it, you had the fracking revolution and young men from the region getting jobs in the West Texas oil fields. Then COVID happens. The oil industry and the economy generally shuts down, and Trump is the one talking about getting things reopened. This was not a community that could just go to work on Zoom. Americana: You point out that some Democrats, like John Fetterman, have been able to win despite lower turnout from Black voters. How much of what Republicans need is conversion, and how much is drop-off from working-class voters who used to vote for Democrats? Patrick Ruffini: In 2016, most of Trump’s margin of victory in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin comes from changes in the Black vote, both in turnout and persuasion. Without Obama at the top of the ticket, this isn’t entirely unexpected. But it has a knock-on effect. What does Hillary Clinton do to try to keep Black turnout high? She talks more about race than Obama did, using terms like “structural racism.” And in so doing, she probably ticks off the white working class. If you’re a laid off steelworker in Ohio, you don’t exactly feel like you’re basking in white privilege. Americana: Before Hillary gets into the race, she talks about criminal justice reform, mass incarceration, maybe we should reverse some of the 1994 crime bill. Patrick Ruffini: Right. And there was this belief that Trump was a uniquely noxious figure on racial issues that would keep Black voters engaged. This assumption turns out to be totally wrong. And in 2020, Trump seems to take a hit in the polls because of his handling of the George Floyd summer, and still does better among Black voters that fall. The priorities these voters have, like safe streets, are not the ones white liberals think. Americana: So what policies should Republicans, when they’re back in power, be enacting to win more of these voters? And what should they be avoiding? Patrick Ruffini: It’s a little hard to answer, because you’ve seen a lot of these trends play out without a big shift in Republican policy priorities. But let’s say that hypothetically there’s a Republican trifecta in 2025. If Republicans view that as a license to run back the 2005 Bush Social Security plan, or do some sort of massive entitlement reform, that would jeopardize the gains in this new coalition. Same goes for trying to repeal Obamacare. Trump was pretty successful at narrowing the perceived gap between the parties on economic issues. The days of a GOP focused on marginal rate cuts are probably over. Americana: Right, the Biden administration has leaned into this problem. It hasn’t gone back to Obama-era free trade policies. It passed an infrastructure bill, it’s backed labor, and it hasn’t gotten a political benefit. Why is that? Patrick Ruffini: Inflation has just overshadowed everything. As a Republican, I’ll concede that Trump’s initial COVID spending did as much to cause inflation as Biden’s policies have. But Trump got all of the upside politically from this spending, and Biden got all the downside as inflation starts to tick up right after he takes office. Americana: There are Democrats who say Trump brings out people other Republicans don’t — we’re talking about that now — but if Republicans run DeSantis or Haley, we can pin them down on Social Security, Medicare, the retirement age. So is Trump actually the strongest potential nominee they have? Patrick Ruffini: He has a long list of strengths and a long list of weaknesses. The assets and liabilities for the other candidates are more of a question mark. What you’re seeing in the polls right now, at least with Haley, is that she doesn’t really lose many voters Trump would get, and gets back some of the suburban voters Trump lost. This is essentially what you saw with the Team Normal Republicans like Youngkin and [Georgia Gov. Brian] Kemp. They don’t lose any votes in places Trump did really well, and they win back enough suburbanites. We seem to be locked into the Trump coalitions as a baseline, but the question is how well can you do in the suburbs? And yet our ideas about this are cryogenically frozen in 2016, where there were just two starkly different coalitions. There was a Romney coalition, and then a Trump coalition, and you had to choose which to embrace. Now there’s a stable Trump coalition and I don’t think you’re going to see much erosion in rural areas, nor will we see a massive reversion to Romney-era support levels for the GOP in suburbs. Those old voting patterns are gone. But if you’re Nikki Haley or Ron DeSantis, and you hold that rural coalition and win back even a third of the Romney-Biden voters in suburbs, you’re winning Georgia comfortably. |